Geography lost and found in economics by Gunther Tichy





One could reflect hours or even days on the title of this lecture proposed by the organiser: Did
geography  at any time play a major role in economic theory, at least in mainstream theory? If not, what
than actually got lost, and when? Furthermore: has modern economic theory really found geography?
Can we detect important geographical aspects in most recent economic mainstream theory? And what
is “geography”?
I will not investigate into this latter question and will leave this tricky problem to geographers. As
an economist I will deal with geography as the location and distribution of economic activity across
space from an economists’ point of view.
1 I will investigate into the geographical aspects in the
economic literature and completely ignore the economic aspects in the geographical literature. I will
argue that geographical factors – at least in my definition – dominated economic development before
economic theory existed as a science. At the time when economics arose as a science in the work of the
great classic economists’, that is in the late 18
th century, the industrial revolution had produced a
bipolar world – Britain and the Rest of the World –, depleted of any geographical aspects. This reality
was modelled in contemporary classical theory; it dominated the dominating Anglo-American
economic theory up to the eighties of our century at least, at a time when the real world had changed
and differed drastically from the models’ world. In the middle of the 19
th century German economic
policy had attacked the classic’s models bipolar view of life – in reality and – consequently – in
economic theory. International success of this alternative theory, however, failed to appear for more
than a hundred years at least. Since than, however, several factors brought geographical determinants
back into world-wide reality: The specialisation of industries within countries due to higher knowledge
intensity, European integration, the loss of dominance first of Britain, than of the United States, as
well as policy efforts to ward off suspected negative effects of globalisation. In the 1980’s economic
theory followed suit – slowly.
I will first sketch the varying importance of geographical factors for economic development and
propose an answer to the question, why economic theory has not found geography in mainstream
theory for more almost two centuries. In the second part I will try to investigate, to which extent
modern economic theory has already found geographical aspects.
*HRJUDSKLFDOIDFWRUVGRPLQDWHHDUO\HFRQRPLFGHYHORSPHQW
                                                          
1  “I suspect that geographers proper will not be entirely pleased at what they see and may deny that the kind of
stylized models that economists find appealing are part of their field.” (Krugman 1991b, xi). However, “partly
because of the novelty, partly because of the inherent sexiness of the stories ... these models are a lot of fun to
work with.” (Krugman 1998, 172). “... the technical tricks that characterize the new economic geography have
opened the door to theoretical modelling of the sort of inherently exciting spatial economic issues that
economists had previously neglected.” (Krugman 1998, 168).geography.doc   23.8.1998
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Until the heydays of industrial revolution economic development depended almost exclusively on
geographic determinants. In the very early days climatic conditions and availability of resources
dominated: Agriculture was formed in the mountains of the Golden Triangle north of Mesopotamia as
in this very place the ancestors of sheep and goat lived and the early forms of grain grew wildly –
geography did matter. After the domestication of animals, the cultivation of plants and after
experience had been gained with the cultivation of (heavier) soil, civilisation centred in the fertile
valleys of Euphrates, Indus, Nile, etc. The dominant centres, however did not form at the sites of the
resources. As administrative and/or trading centres they arose at sites characterised by intersections of
trading routes, change of the means of transportation, or crossing of rivers. Merchants met each others
at those places;
2 quite often not only the means of transportation had to changed at those places, quite
often a different merchant as well served the further part of the route, so that the goods were frequently
sold in these places.
3 From an economic point of view therefore two important facts can be deducted:
Firstly, that geographical factors dominated early economic development; and secondly, that not the
factors of production dominating Classical Theory – labour, capital and soil – worked out as the
dominating determinants of actual economic development in these early times, but trade-induced
accumulation as well as condensation of knowledge and information; modern economic theory has
become aware of this important aspect.
The dominance of trade over production as the main determinant of agglomeration was one of the
characteristics of economic development not only in early times but in antiquity and in the Middle
Ages as well. One of the most famous examples is the well-known Silk road: Due to a large number of
facts – wars, position and influence of states, transport technology, etc. – this “road” shifted there and
back in time, between Siberia and Indian Ocean (Haussig 1983, 1988), but wealth and economic
development was wherever the “road” actually was, the route relevant for the time being. Geography
mattered and trade mattered and this is true for inner-European development as well: In Austria, for
instance, European centre of iron production in the 16
th century, agglomeration took place and wealth
accumulated at the trading-places (Bruck/Mur, Steyr, Waidhofen), not were the iron was found, where
it was melted or at the centres of production of iron goods. The period between 1500 and 1750 is
known as the age of merchant capitalism. Despite very high land-transport costs,
4 inner-European trade
in grain, cattle, salt, metal and textiles was important, and considerable and profitable trade took place
with Asia.
5 European regions specialised in their economic activities, and the big trading houses and
trading companies created an European market: “The Whole World as to Trade, is but as one Nation or
People, and therein Nations are as Persons.” (Dudley North, 1691, cited in Glamann 1971, 452). The
centre of this one world of European Trade however shifted from the South of Europe to its North,
from the Mediterranean to the North Sea – another aspect in which geography mattered in the real
world of economic development of those times. However: No well defined and elaborated economic
theory existed at that time: Macroeconomic thinking was unfamiliar in this age of mercantilism,
contemporaries saw no difference between nations and persons, as the quotation of Dudley North
demonstrates, thus susceptible for the fallacy of composition. Both, nations as well as persons were
                                                          
2  Along the land-route of the silk-road Turfan, Dunhuang, Kashgar and Barygaza (at the estuary of the
Narmada) should be mentioned as such type of trading places, Kiev and Trebizond in the North, and Sri
Lanka, Aden and Damascus along the sea-route (Haussig 1988).
3  This is in complete accordance with models of New Economic Geography: Fujita and Mori (1996)
demonstrated that such nodes generate cusps in the market potential function.
4  In the late 16
th century the transport of grain from Krakow to Venice caused an fourfold increase in price
(Glamann 1971, 455).
5  Quantitatively extra-European trade was small – in 1700 Britain imported 359 000 tons (tonnage of shipping)
and exported 182 000 tons, while the East-Indian trade accounted for 5000 tons (Glamann 1971, 454). More
than half of the imports, however, was timber and two fifth of the exports coal. East-Indian imports in
contrast were spices, tobacco, tea, coffee, luxury textiles, much less bulky but much more expensive.geography.doc   23.8.1998
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considered to become wealthy by accumulation of gold. Economic theory could not find geography in
this period, because no elaborated economic theory existed.
*HRJUDSK\´ORVWµLQWKHUHDOZRUOGRI,QGXVWULDO5HYROXWLRQ
The real world changed drastically in the course of the Industrial Revolution. Any differences among
nations and regions, typical for the pre-industrial period, were dwarfed by the differences between
industrialised Britain and the Rest of the World. Britain produced and exported industrial goods, the
Rest of the World extracted raw materials, food and other inputs for the British industrial complex.
Principal British exports goods in 1831 were industrial products as cotton yarns and textiles (24
percent), woollen yarns and textiles (7 percent), linens (3 percent), and cutlery and hardware (2
percent), principal import goods cotton (19 percent), sugar (15 percent), tea and coffee (11 percent),
grain (9 percent) and flax and hemp (5 percent)(Woodruff 1979, 664, 672). In stark contrast to the time
before, production displaced trade as the primary source of wealth, at least in dominating Britain:
British coal production increased from 11 million metric tons in 1800 to 50 million metric tons in 1850
and 230 million metric tons in 1900, British production of pig iron from 0,2 million metric tons (1800)
to 2,7 (1850) and 8,8 million metric tons (1900).
6 From 1750 to 1800 British industrial production
increased by 160 percent, from 1800 to 1850 by 360 percent and from 1850 to 1900 by a further 200
percent (Mitchell 1979). The geographically differentiated, multi-polar world of mercantilism was
displaced by a bi-polar division into industrialised Britain and non-industrialised Rest-of-the World.
7 A
bi-polar world, however, leaves no room for geographic differentiation.
Economic theory as a science originated in this very situation of reality:
8 Britain as the leading and
unrivalled industrial power of the world. Adam Smith in his famous “Inquiry into the nature and causes
of the wealth of nations” (1776) emphasised that neither gold nor resources nor trade constitute the
basis of the wealth of a nation but its productive capacity. He opted for free trade as a “vent for
surplus”.
9 David Ricardo (Principles of political economy and taxation, 1821) emphasised that trade
and competitiveness rely not on absolute but on relative, on comparative advantages,
10 thus calming
the anxieties of Britain’s less industrialised trading partners, feeling unprotectedly exposed to the
competitiveness and power of the dominating nation: Everybody gains from free trade – according to
Ricardo’s theory. No doubt: The main elements of classical economic theory were custom-tailored to
the British situation and to British interests, to the interests’ of the leading power in world production
and world trade.
In its developed form, the (neo)classical theory of trade is the famous 2x2x2-theory: Two countries
– Britain, later the U.S., and the Rest of the World –, two factors of production – labour and capital –,
and two goods – manufactured ones and others (inputs). Labour and capital are considered as immobile
                                                          
6  World production of pig iron increased from 1 million ton in 1820 to approximately 20 tons in 1900
(Woodruff 1979, 682), production of ferrous metals in general increased sixty-five times between 1820 and
1910 (Woodruff 1979, 660).
7  World trade in value terms increased nearly nine-fold between 1820 and 1880 (Woodruff 1979, 658).
8  The intention of this paper is not – and cannot be – to elaborate the depth and richness of the different
theories. Its intention is to confront the importance of geographical factors in reality and in economic theory
at different times; it therefore refers only to those parts of economic theory which are relevant for this very
purpose.
9  Kurz 1990a, 244f
10  Notice that Ricardo’s famous example in chapter VII refers to cloth as an export good of Britain (and an
import good of Portugal) and wine as import good of Britain (and export good of Portugal).geography.doc   23.8.1998
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within this model,
11 an assumption not without a corollary in the real world of the dominant economy.
Britain protected her comparative advantage by highly restrictive practices: The severe restrictions on
the migration of skilled artisans were not lifted before 1825, the restrictions on the export of machinery
and important techniques not until 1843 (Landes 1969, 148; Woodruff 1979, 678). Similar restrictions
are known to exist in the leading power to follow, the United States: In that case the restrictions
referred to the qualification of immigrants and to the exports of high-technology – for the rest of the
goods the U.S. fights (or fought at least as long as its dominance was undisputed) for free trade as
well.
Geographic elements completely lacked in the classical models for two reasons: First the structure
of a model (or a world) consisting of two regions – Britain and the rest of the world – is not rich
enough to model geographical influences, and secondly the model promised quick convergence of any
differences anyhow: Free trade was assumed to quickly equalise prices among nations, assure world-
wide full employment even of immobile factors of production, and equalisation of factor prices.
The free-trade-convergence model of classical economic theory served the interests’ of the leading
economic powers well – first Britain, then United States – and it so became the workhorse of Anglo-
American theory and the basis for the free-trade ideology until today. The high level of the models’
abstraction shielded it against critique, theoretical as well as practical one. Geography could not enter
into this model, neither internationally nor nationally and it did not enter, because it was of no
importance in the real world of Adam Smith and David Ricardo.
*HRJUDSKLFHOHPHQWV´IRXQGµLQWKH*HUPDQPRGHORILQGXVWULDO
FDWFKXS
“... the Crystal Palace Exposition in 1851 marked the apogee of Britain’s career as the ‘workshop of
the world’. ... Her merchandise dominated in all markets of the world; her manufacturers feared no
competition” (Landes 1969, 124); British income per capita was approximately two-and a-half times
the German one This outstanding position had resulted from Britain’s head-start in the Industrial
revolution and the big cost advantage of sea transport. Both advantages, however, turned out as
temporary. Germany worked hard to catch up, using methods very different from the British ones, and
the fast diffusion of railways quickly reduced the cost-advantage of sea transport: The cost of land
transport halved in the eighty years between 1834 and 1914 (Woodruff 1979, 690).
The countries of Continental Europe in general had a very slow start as the dominating British
industry destroyed the weak starting points for industrialisation and overtook their markets.
Nevertheless the countries worked hard to improve thei material infrastructure of roads, waterways
and railroads, with Germany at the forefront. The immaterial infrastructure of expertise in new
industrial technology was slowly improved by employing British artisans, and, especially in Germany,
by government efforts to create technical schools, embedded in a larger system of advanced education,
non-teaching academies, museums and technical expositions (Landes 1969, 151, 340 seqq). The
formation of the Zollverein enlarged the economic area in 1834, liberal policies in the fifties and
sixties relieved industries from restricting regulations (Gewerbefreiheit). Increasing scale and the
forces that brought it about combined to recast the economic map of Europe in the form of localisation,
spatial concentration, relocation and the rise of new centres of industrial activity. Geographical
aspects reappeared in economic development with the transition from a bi-polar to a multi-polar world.
                                                          
11  In contrast to the complete lack of international mobility of labour and capital, perfect mobility was assumed
within countries. The nation thereby was implicitly reduced to one point. so that regional factors – geography
within the country – were excluded as well.geography.doc   23.8.1998
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Britain’s share in world industrial output shrank from one third in 1870 to one fifth in 1900 and one
seventh at the eve of World War I.
Two German particularities must be mentioned: Firstly the early transition from family- to
professional management, the predilection for large enterprises and the political acceptance of mergers
(Fukuyama 1995, 252). The particularity, however, most relevant not only for the catch-up but for a
more distant future as well, was the heavy weight government put on compulsory education and the
establishment of a science base; in this field Germany was far ahead of Britain (Landes 1969, 340),
and this advantage proved essential in the coming period of marriage of science and technology. As a
result the German system was characterised by institutionalised innovation, while the British
manufacturers preferred empiricist tinkering and refrained from innovations not immediately
successful (Landes 1969, 352). Above all the German chemical industry was famous for its scientific
laboratories, and it was the German chemical industry which proved to be the most successful. “Pure
and applied science were brought together in an extraordinary way. So much so, that on the eve of war
the Western industrial nations had begun to make what they wanted out of what they had – a very
different situation from that which had prevailed in the nineteenth century. International trade and
development then had depended on the close inter-relatedness and reciprocity of the industrial with the
primary producing world. Europe had enriched itself (none so much as Britain) from this arrangement.
But Europe’s new wealth ... had weakened some of the economic ties that bound Europe to the primary
producing parts of the world.” (Woodruff 1979, 685). The bi-polar world – Britain and the Rest of the
world – had come to an end, a multi-polar world re-emerged, geography stood at the brink of regaining
importance.
German economic theory reflected this situation, completely different to the British one. German
economic reflection had always been different from the Anglo-American one, historical-national rather
than abstract-analytical; it attempted to explain and predict the rise and fall of the nation, to explain
the national system of political economy, not the causes of the wealth of nations in general. Spatial
aspects had an important place in German economic thinking, e.g. in the location theory of Thünen
(1826). The most important opponent to the British theory of the classical free-trade-convergence
model, was List (1841). He was most interested in explaining the changing position of nations in
history, and in devising strategies for a backward nation to catch up with the leading countries, the
situation of his home-country Germany at that time. He correctly emphasised, that free trade would
preserve the advantage of the leader, that it would even increase the inequality among nations. Free
trade in goods could be accepted by backward nations if accompanied by free movement of expertise at
best, a claim heavily opposed to by Britain. List suggested four policy options for Germany: Investing
in education to promote an adequately trained work-force; creating a network of infrastructures to
allow the dissemination of the most important resource, know-how; creating economic ties among
countries, such as customs unions, and to protect infant industries to allow them to develop the
expertise needed to face international competition. List has become famous for his last proposal –
Erziehungszölle – but this was only one of several ones, all reflecting closely what Germany had to do
– and actually did – to improve her backward position. Gerschenkron (1962) emphasised that industrial
catch-up occurs by no means automatically, but requires a significant amount of effort and
“institutional instruments, for which there was little or nor counterpart in an established industrial
country” (Gerschenkron 1962, 7).
Translated into the language of modern theory List – and Gerschenkron – emphasise that the route
leading each nation to build her technological competence is highly path-dependent. More than one
technological avenue leads to the wealth of a nation, more than one single equilibrium distribution of
production among nations exists; each nation has her own characteristics and specialisation: Britain
traded with the world, Germany with Europe at that time, and recent econometric tests confirm that the
differences among industries within most countries are smaller than the differences among identical
industries in different countries (Costello 1993; Bayoumi and Prasad 1995; Helg et al 1995). In
summary: Geographical factors certainly were of importance in the Europe of the late 19
th centurygeography.doc   23.8.1998
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they could  play a role within the theory sketched by the German school of those days. But this branch
of theory was not accepted by the mainstream.
*HRJUDSK\´ORVWµLQWKHFORVHGQDWLRQDOVWDWHIURPWRWKHVL[WLHV
“The growing need of the most industrialised nations in 1913 was to find markets for their industrial
goods. In sharp contrast to the relations that existed earlier ... the world’s major exporters of
manufactured goods were increasingly the world’s major importers of manufactured goods (Woodruff
1979, 685; my italics G.T.). The struggle for economic dominance set in; World War I was one of the
consequences and it changed the European economic system. The break-down of the gold standard, the
economic troubles of the Great Depression and the devaluation races of the thirties marked the end of
the seven-decades-long period of a multi-centred world-economy. Countries believed to fare best as
closed national economies with their own national demand policy. Keynes provided the theoretical
basis for this approach, considering demand as the key element for the state and the development of an
economy. Contrary to Say’s law of classical theory, demand was assumed to automatically create its
matching supply, but market forces were not believed to guarantee sufficient demand and full
employment. Full employment and growth therefore became the dominant targets of economic policy.
After the Second World War this model continued to dominate economic policy and – slightly
modified to the Neoclassical Synthesis – economic theory as well, even if the underlying conditions
had changed considerably: Far from the depression-conditions of the thirties the industrial countries
approached full employment. Sufficient demand was nevertheless considered as the crucial factor for
the wealth of the nation, and national demand policy was held responsible for full employment.
Foreign trade entered this model as an important demand component: As politicians – following the
tradition of the thirties – regarded insufficient demand as the main threat, they considered export led
growth as an important remedy. The dominant nation of that time – the United States – pressed for free
trade – for obvious reasons – and the European countries did not object to liberalising foreign trade
and even capital movements, as long as foreign trade soared – as it actually did. The countries did not
realise that they thereby undermined their capacity to ensure full employment by demand management:
Germany was the first country to find “Außenwirtschaftliche Absicherung” – external safeguard – of
national demand policy as the critical element in the early sixties; other countries soon experienced the
same problem. Two types of theoretical models were developed to deal with the problem of external
“leakages”: Two-country models and the model of the Small Open Economy (SMOPEC). Both were
devoid of geographical aspects: The two-county models – “We and the Rest of the World” – returned
to the bi-polar world, familiar from classical and neo-classical theory, even if they emphasised demand
rather than supply. The SMOPEC-model concentrated on national elements and introduced foreign
relations as leakages only, as restrictions to domestic demand policy. Evidently geography could not
matter in both types of models.
In the late sixties full employment was attained in most countries and the demand model evidently
did not fit any more. Empirical economists posed the question “Why growth rates differ” (Denison
1967), and supply-side considerations reappeared – in the economic policy of Thatcher and Reagan
earlier than in economic theory. Supply-side theory in general, however, was a superficial interlude.
The incentive for a fundamental change in economic theory rather stemmed from foreign trade: Due to
liberalisation, full employment and high growth foreign trade soared,
12 but in a way very different from
traditional theories’ expectations: Not trade with dissimilar goods among countries with different
factor endowments soared, as was the case in the 19
th century and as the Heckscher-Ohlin hypothesis
had predicted, but trade with similar, industrial goods between similar, industrialised countries
(Frankel 1995, 73)! This was a big challenge to the dominating neoclassical theory and the off-springgeography.doc   23.8.1998
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for the New Theories – New Theory of Industrial Organisation, New Trade Theory, New Growth
Theory, New Theory of Innovation (NSI) – starting from new assumptions and thereby providing the
basis for the inclusion of at least elementary geographical considerations.
*HRJUDSKLFDOHOHPHQWVLQUHFHQWHFRQRPLFWKLQNLQJ
The classical model was a-geographical as it modelled the bi-polar state of the economic world of the
late 18
th and early 19
th century. Subsequently reality and theory diverged: With the industrialisation
and specialisation of the Continental European countries, geographical elements re-emerged in reality,
but in economic theory the neoclassical model dominated, became more and more abstract and exempt
of any elements not suitable for mathematical treatment. This style of rigid modelling gave rise to
economics as a science but eliminated any connections to geography. Based on constant returns to
scale, perfect competition and rid of any externalities, the model could not deal with concentration and
specialisation (spatial as well industrial); with labour and capital assumed as perfectly mobile within
countries but completely immobile in-between and with firms and countries devoid of any dimensions,
the model could not deal with spatial aspects as well. Devoid of any structural aspects it was unable to
deal with differences among countries.
13 Foreign trade was modelled to bring about price and factor
equalisation based on comparative advantage; the model did not incorporate transport costs and rested
on partial immobility: If goods and factors of production are mobile, comparative advantage can no
longer be defined. Neoclassical theory furthermore neglected aspects of distribution, as the model
implied strong convergence.
The neoclassical model proved to be the workhorse of mainstream-economics up to the eighties;
wherever economists had to deal with spatial aspects they were forced to use different models – in
regional economics or in location theory. In regional economics models of Keynesian spirit dominated,
implying quantity adjustment rather than market clearing by competitive price adjustment; the export-
base concept was the most applied one. Polarisation models stressed cumulative causation and
therefore divergence: Some of the determinants of growth are locally determinded (e.g. local
productivity is a function of local growth), some globally (e.g. the wage rate). Regional divergence
therefore is more likely than convergence. Classical location theory rested on partial models: Factors
of production were assumed perfectly mobile, scale economies and imperfect competition prevailed –
allowing economies of agglomeration – and transport costs did matter. Firms, however, were assumed
identical, market structure and motives of firms were ignored. “Much of the literature ... has ... been
obsessed with geometry – with the shape of market areas on an idealized landscape ...” (Krugman
1991b, 5). In general many of the new elements that nowadays have been incorporated in a more
geographic-minded economy could have been found in regional or location economics. Economists of
these branches were regarded as second class, however, and their articles did not find their way into
the core journals. The adaptation of economic theory, therefore, was endogenous, resulting from the
development of new mathematical tools, able to deal with new, more complicated assumptions.
The changeover to a new model wouldn’t have been that fast, however, hadn’t the real questions
been so much at odds with the esoterical questions the neoclassical theory dealt with. Already in the
early fifties Leontief’s paradox – America exported labour intensive goods and imported capital
intensive ones which contradicts neoclassical trade theory – forced economists to reconsider the
assumptions about factors of production, differentiating between skilled and non-skilled labour,
vintages of physical capital, later to introduce technical progress or human capital as additional factors
of production. The uneven economic development of countries posed the question “Why growth rates
differ” (Denison 1967); theory’s inability to give an answer induced empirical growth accounting
                                                                                                                                                                           
12  Between 1950 and 1980 world trade increased by more than 12 percent per annum (6,8 % real).
13  For geographic patterns in European trade see Tichy (1992).geography.doc   23.8.1998
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(Abramovitz 1956), finding the “residual” i.e. the unexplained factor as the main but unconvincing
explanation. For other pressing problems of those days – growing concentration, rise of the
multinational corporation, increasing specialisation, optimum size and composition of customs and
currency areas (Tichy 1997a) or consequences of globalisation – neoclassical theory was not the
appropriate instrument as well. It predicted convergence, but the actual debate oscillated between
“delinking” of the poor South from the rich North and the fear that industrialisation of the developing
countries destroys industrial countries’ full employment. At the same time the question of the
optimality of world-wide free trade rose again – in Europe as a result of regional integration, in the
United States as a consequence of dwindling own hegemony (McCulloch 1993), rise of Japan, the
Southeast-Asian tigers and even Europe (end of the so-called Eurosklerosis). The win-win
interpretation of free trade gave way to an awareness of its distributional aspects – rent shifting.
The elements of a new model were developed in the New Theory of International Organisation, in
New Growth Theory, in innovation theory, in New Trade Theory and in consequence a New Economic
Geography resulted. In the course of the seventies and early eighties they all switched to the new, more
realistic assumptions of increasing economies to scale, imperfect competition and externalities and
elaborated respective mathematical models.
14. In the late eighties the profession became aware of the
spatial dimension of the new paradigm: 1988
15 Lucas, shifting to a new and potentially more relevant
field of analysis, remarked when looking at the widely differing and fluctuating growth rates: “I do not
see how one can look on figures like these without seeing them as representing possibilities. In there
some action a government of India could take that would take the Indian economy to grow like
Indonesia’s or Egypt’s?”(emphasis in original). Lucas’ question was right, his method, however,
highly inadequate. 1990 Porter investigated into the competitive advantage of nations, and in the same
year Krugman (1991b, 1) “suddenly realized that I have spent my whole life as a international
economist thinking and writing about economic geography, without being aware of it.” Geography had
been found in economics – at least conceptually.
Several characteristics distinguish the new type of models from the traditional ones. Most important
and most often emphasised, are increasing economies to scale and imperfect competition, which need
no further description. Externalities assumed are specialised skills, provision of specialised not-easily
traded inputs and technological spillovers. Countries and regions have a spatial dimension and
transport costs, therefore, prevail.
16 Technical progress is endogenous in most models, while the
assumptions on the mobility of the different factors of production vary: Physical and financial capital
are assumed mobile in most cases, human capital and/or knowhow mostly mobile among regions of
one country, less so among countries. Labour is regarded as mobile in a few models only. Countries
differ, especially as to their legal and financial systems, their education systems and their starting
points. Path dependence and multiple equilibria are typical for all these new models, so that a wide
differentiation and geographical diversity can result.
The several assumptions are combined in an already large number of different models with different
ambitions and goals, unsuitable for a consistent description as to their spatial results. The price these
models have to pay for their greater realism is that they cannot be solved analytically in most cases,
and that their calibrations and simulations are extremely sensitive to parameter variations. It is not
easy to deduct generalised results with broad applicability. The following paragraphs will therefore be
                                                          
14  Krugman (1998, 164) coined the slogan “Dixit-Stiglitz, icebergs, evolution, and the computer” as a short-
hand characteristcs. Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) elaborated the standard model of monopolistic competition, the
“iceberg”-assumption, is a trick to model transport costs (see footnote 16), “evolution” implies the conditions
guiding to one of several possible equilibria, and “computer” refers to the fact, that models normally can’t be
solved analytically but need the computer for calibrations and simulations.
15  Originally written for the Marshall Lectures given at Cambridge University in 1985.
16  For reasons of modelling transport costs frequently are assumed in the form of “iceberg”-costs, implying that
the transported good smelts away in proportion to the transport distance.geography.doc   23.8.1998
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restricted to the general insights that the new approaches can provide into aspects of economics related
to potential geographical aspects.
17
1HZJURZWKWKHRU\
The New Growth Theory retains the neoclassical model as much as possible but attempts to endogenise
technological progress by the introduction of externalities in the form of learning by doing or learning
by producing. As these are external to the firm but internal to the economy the model is able to
produce potential polarisation in an otherwise neoclassical model, a result highly interesting under
geographical aspects. Because of the model’s challenging solution on the one hand, and its highly
abstract character on the other hand, unrealistic as an explanation of real world development (Kurz
1998), a lively debate arose whether polarisation can actually be observed. Sala-i-Martin (1990, as in
6DODL0DUWLQLQWURGXFHGWZRFRQFHSWV FRQYHUJHQFHDQG FRQYHUJHQFH FRQYHUJHQFH






20 within the neoclassical model to demonstrate a convergence rate of 2
percent per year (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1991; Sala-i-Martin 1996), thus conserving neoclassical
results even under the new assumptions.
The results are subject to at least two types of criticisms, theoretical and empirical ones. Already a
decade before Barro and Sala-i-Martin Abramovitz (1986) had criticised the neoclassical convergence
theory of productivity catch-up caused by unexploited technology: It can neither explain late comers to
forge ahead, leading countries to fall behind nor changes of rank within the bulk, which frequently
occur. Furthermore it is well known, that Germany, for instance, did not forge ahead of Britain because
of catching up in the technological fields dominated by Britain and applying British methods, but by
choosing a completely different approach in very different industries – as chapter 3 tried to
demonstrate. As to empirics Abramovitz criticised that the evidence for catch-up primarily by closing
the productivity gap is weak, even for the advanced industrial countries. The criticism of weak
empirical confirmation of convergence is true for the data of Barro and Sala-i-Martin as well: Detailed
analysis reveals polarisation results at least for the poorest European regions (Tichy 1997b, 25seqq).
4XDKDVHTTGHPRQVWUDWHGWKDW FRQYHUJHQFHFDQUHVXOWIURPVWDWLVWLFDOLQYDULDQFHDQG
doesn’t say anything about how the poorest 10 percent of the distribution are catching up with the
richest 10 percent: In effect concentration took place at the upper as well on the lower end of the
concentration with a consequent weakening of the center (Quah 1993; Quah 1996a; Pritchett 1997),
consistent with the theory of convergence clubs. Empirical evidence therefore suggests that both,
convergence as well as polarisation forces are in action, with neighbouring regions usually belonging
to the same club, irrespective of belonging to the same country or not. Similar results show up in
studies investigating the differences as to the character of the shocks hitting the regions and the
consequent reactions: 20 to 60 percent of the shocks are idiosyncratic (Decressin and Fatás 1995) and
the countries react distinctly different even to common shocks (Fuss 1997). Today’s world is
differentiated and it will remain so.
                                                          
17  The New Theory of Industrial Organisation and the New Trade Theory will be somewhat neglected in this
paper, partly for reasons of time and space, partly because most of their geographically interesting aspects are
dealt with under the other headlines.
18  In country studies conditional convergence was investigated, i.e. the convergence with a set of additional
variables held constant.
19  Quah, D.T, 1993; Pritchett 1998
20  .48 states of U.S., 47 prefectures of Japan, 90 regions of EU, 10 provinces of Canada.geography.doc   23.8.1998
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As far as standard economic thinking considered geographical aspects at all, the availability of
(natural) resources found most attention, thus reflecting the state of the world in the late 18
th century.
In general concentration of knowledge, be it trading knowledge or administration, appears to have
determined economic development much more forcefully than mineral wealth. Modern theory has
accepted this facts and emphasises the accumulation of human capital, knowledge networks,
innovation and specialisation. Germany was the first country to recognise the importance of this
additional factor of production in the early 19
th century. Having realised the importance of a broad-
based technical education and of in-house-R&D laboratories appears to have been one of the social
innovations most important for further economic development, decisive in its contribution to a
continuous flow of radical innovations.
Modern innovation theory stresses the importance of National Systems of Innovation (NSI), a
concept introduced by Lundvall (according to Freeman 1997, 24) and first applied to Japan by Freeman
(1987); the idea however can be easily traced back to List (1841). It says that the technological
abilities of a nation’s firms are the main source of her technological prowess; the abilities are national
and can be built by national action. Archibugi and Pianta (1992, 148) point to the striking diversity not
only in the nature of the different NSI and the different ways of introducing innovations, but also to
the different outcomes of these activities at the sectoral level. The national profiles in science and
technology are not only strikingly diverse, their diversity and specialisation is still growing. Most
industrialised countries therefore appear now present at the technological frontier in their selected field
of specialisation.
This is in stark contrast to the neoclassical mainstream, assuming knowledge to be a free good,
available worldwide and it raises the question: Why is technological knowledge so little mobile? This
question is still under discussion, but externalities, economies to scale, learning effects (accumulation),
slowness of learning new things and strategies of multinational corporations may be of greatest
importance.
Nation-specific factors playing a crucial role in shaping the technological character of a nation are
its institutions, especially education and research facilities, direct and indirect (via defence) support of
innovation, and the way industries’ co-operation is organised,
21 in combination with Marshall’s famous
externalities: specialised skills, provision of specialised inputs – both clearly dependent on the
education and science network –, and local technological spillovers, mainly via “transfer by feet”, i.e.
mobility of skilled personal in-between local firms. Much of the nationally accumulated knowledge is
of tacit character; its importance is best characterised by Foray’s (1991) phrase that in those industrial
districts “the secrets of industry are in the air” – off course the secrets of that very industry branch or
technology in which the district is specialised.
22
Multinational firms were supposed to quickly erode the national specialisation by transferring
research, development and production to whatever place relatively best suited, thus quickly creating a
homogenised undifferentiated world. As far as research has shown up to now, this is not the case, at
least for the multinationals based in large countries. Strategic research and headquarter functions
remain concentrated in the home country: The theory of strategic asset selection (Caves 1991) defines
the multinational firm as a bundle of heterogeneous intermediate products, technologies and skills
producing a bundle of products with national specifics. Acquisition of foreign firms and direct
                                                          
21  See e.g. Piore and Sabel (1984) on North-Italy.
22  It is somewhat astonishing that one has to emphasise the importance and non-transferability of specialised
knowledge: Everybody is aware that ham from Parma or Camembert cheese cannot be imitated, even if it may
appear not too difficult to feed pigs, smoke ham and add the appropriate ferments to milk. Only in Parma or in
France, however, one can learn the secrets out of the air of a long tradition. Industrial knowhow surely is not
easier to transfer than ham- or cheese-knowhow.geography.doc   23.8.1998
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investment in foreign countries serves to increase skills, especially the skills necessary to serve the
foreign market as well; it normally does not distract strategic functions or activities from the
headquarter. R&D is done at home and is significantly influenced by home-country characteristics
(Patel and Pavitt 1991). Archibugi and Michie (1997b) proposed to distinguish within technological
globalisation between „global exploitation of technology“, „global technological cooperation“ and
„global generation of technology“. In the first and in the second case innovative activity remains were
it had been before; global generation of technology is the only form implying locally decentralised
R&D. Casson (1991, 272) emphasised that „the story of globalised R&D is the story of a fairly small
number of very large firms carrying out research in a small number of leading industrialised
countries.” Patel (1997, 207) restricted it to multinationals with their headquarter in small countries:
The patents of Swiss and British subsidiaries (at the U.S. patent office) comprise two fifth of their
mother’s patents, while only 8 percent and 1 percent for U.S. and Japanese firms. In addition global
generation of technology shows up in traditional industries rather than in high-tech and it appears to
stem from the acquisition of research intensive firms rather than from deliberate decentralisation of
R&D (Cantwell 1997, 230). This is due to the fact, that decentralised research and development in the
foreign subsidiaries is less efficient than in the headquarter (by 10 percent according to Adam and
Jaffe 1994).
In fact most countries have increased their specialisation in technological activities,
23 small
countries are forced to higher levels of specialisation than large ones, and countries with a strongly
specialised activity in selected sectors tend to show better industrial and technological performance
(Archibugi and Pianta 1992). Multinationals even contributed towards this specialisation as far as they
utilise the comparative advantages offered by different National Innovation Systems.
In using the words “innovation” and “specialisation” one has to be extremely careful, however:
Innovation is not restricted to the high-tech sector and specialisation concerns very specific products in
most cases. The United States and Japan, which specialise to some extent on R&D-intensive industries,
lost world-market shares in high-tech products to less advanced Southeast-Asia. This suggests that
less-advanced countries can easily produce at least part of the so-called high-tech goods. The EU,
specialising more on “mainstream” industries
24 gained world-market shares in goods not normally
considered to be optimally produced in advanced countries. Evidently these goods can be produced
less easily elsewhere, probably because they afford as much innovation as high-tech goods (even if less
research) and specialised skills (“industrial air”) additionally, not available in less-advanced countries.
Specialisation in Europe frequently does not refer to branches or broad categories of goods, but is
restricted to very specific products: On the NACE 2-digit level little specialisation among the EU-
countries can be detected, while there is substantial specialisation at the 3-digit level (European
Commission 1999, chapter 2). In the U.S. otherwise considerable “macro-specialisation” can be
detected with the car industry in the Mid-West, textiles and apparel in the South, etc. Krugman (1991b,
tables 3.2 to 3.4) and Decressin and Fatás (1995, 1629seq) clearly demonstrate the difference in the
type of specialisation between European countries and comparable U.S.-regions. Insofar a very
differentiated picture (of up to now) unexplained geographical abundance emerges, challenging
economists and geographers as well. What differentiates countries or regions is, probably, not so much
their methods of production in certain industries, but much more  their relative strength’s or
weaknesses in very specific types of products.
       #   1HZ(FRQRPLF*HRJUDSK\SURSHU(FRQRPLHVRI
VFDOHDQGWUDQVSRUWDWLRQFRVWV
                                                          
23  The opposite pattern, however, has emerged in scientific research.
24  For a definition see Peneder 1998.geography.doc   23.8.1998
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The offspring of New Economic Geography was the combination of economies to scale with transport
costs. The most important results showed up already in the very first paper: the likelihood of multiple
equilibria and potential shifts from periphery to core and back again if transport costs
25 are lowered in
several steps. In his seminal paper Krugman (1991a) assumed two regions and two sectors: agriculture
with constant returns (perfect competition) and geographically fixed factors, and manufactures with
increasing returns, produced by mobile factors. The economies to scale are purely internal to the firm.
Even in absence of externalities, scale economies, transport costs and factor mobility, manufacturers
tend to clump together because of forward and backward linkages; they want to concentrate production
near markets (demand linkage). An opposite centrifugal tendency results from producers desire to
move away from competitors. As a result multiple equilibria arise: With high transportation costs
economic activity is evenly divided among the two regions; low transport costs allow three equilibria:
even distribution or concentration in either one of the regions, whichever gets a head start.
Later, more sophisticated models allow more complicated dynamics: Krugman and Venables (1995)
assume two (almost) identical countries, each with a perfectly competitive agricultural and a
monopolistically competitive manufacturing sector, producing consumption goods and intermediaries
(input-output linkage). Labour is immobile. At high transport costs both regions are essentially self-
sufficient. Gradually declining transport costs lead first to a concentration of production in one of the
countries, which for any (stochastic?) reason has a slight initial advantage of a larger manufacturing
sector or more intermediate goods. Scale advantages dominate. A core forms and the periphery suffers
a decline in real income. A further fall in transport costs and increasing wages in the core
overcompensate scale economies so that “the world” tends towards convergence. The innovative point
is the U-pattern of adjustment, the – temporary – polarisation even without cumulative causation.
The result is in startling contrast to the neoclassical model which implies rising costs of
agglomeration. The new models reveal, that demand linkages, input-output linkages or technological
(supply) linkages (limited geographical reach of spillover) can overcompensate the neoclassical
mechanism. Whether this implies a friendly or an unfriendly story, depends on further details: If the
periphery learns, as Germany did in the 19
th and Southeast Asia in the 20
th century, convergence may
actually occur. If, however, elements of cumulative causation are added – accumulation of knowledge,
advantages of richly specialised inputs, large market size, accumulation of capital, etc.) permanent
polarisation will turn out as a more likely result. If transportation costs are – correctly – defined as a
very wide concept, including all hindrances to trade and direct investment (market access, legal
system, financial system, regulations, uncertainty, etc), the models’ results conform to the theory of
convergence clubs: The rich industrialised countries and/or regions converge; due to low interaction
costs they find themselves on the upward-sloping part of the U. The poor countries and regions,
however, rather diverge, as they are on the downward-sloping branch of the U, due to high interaction
costs. The authors themselves, however, warn against over-interpreting the results, as the model is still
rather simple, e.g. completely neglecting capital or the simple geography of assuming two countries
only.
Similar considerations turned out seminal in models of localisation theory as well, in which labour
is usually assumed as mobile. Christaller (1933) and Lösch (1940) had already used economies of scale
to explain how central places develop; Pred (1966) emphasised the contribution of initial advantages.
The New Theory could base on these assumptions, but progressed from partial to general equilibrium
models. Similar results show up as before: Multiple equilibria are frequent, polarisation quite likely,
and the results frequently depend on initial conditions and the character of the disturbance: A flat
distribution of industrial locations for instance, if randomly disturbed, can easily change into a
structure in which all manufacturing is concentrated in only two regions (Krugman 1998, 169).
Cumulative processes in a general equilibrium model of a circular economy with 12 locations may
form one, two or three cities depending on parameter values (Krugman 1993). In an economy with
                                                          
25  Transportation costs in this theory is a synonym for all types of impediments to trade.geography.doc   23.8.1998
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multiple industries and scale economies circular causality through forward (real income) and backward
linkages (specialisation) develops a system of central places similar to the static Christaller-model
(Fujita et al 1997 according to Krugman 1998). Transportation infrastructure chanellises space, as
firms choose a location at specific points, which may cause agglomeration or decentralisation
depending on transportation cost (Thisse 1993).
In evaluating the results one must not forget, that the New Economic Geography is less than a
decade old, and that the models quickly get mathematically very complicated, not to be solved by
analytical methods. Only rather simple combinations of assumptions therefore have been modelled up
to now. On a less formal basis it is obvious, however, that a combination of the new impulses of New
Growth Theory, Innovation Theory and Economic Geography will provide new insights not only in the
spatial dimensions of economic processes but in their intrinsic character as well. This is especially true
for the processes of regional concentration and clustering. Regional concentration results from the
combination of economies to scale and transport costs with various elements of circular causation as
intermediate-goods industries following final-goods industries, thus creating an input- and skill-
infrastructure liable to attract further final-goods producers, growing market size attracting even more
producers, and so on. Rising wages normally don’t stop agglomeration as they expand the market;
rather they trigger off a process of concentration on high-value products. The European experience of
the sixties suggests that the periphery more likely gains from full employment of labour in the centre,
enforcing massive outsourcing, than from large wage differentials.
The interaction of elements proposed by Economic Geography and innovation theory can explain
why clusters form and how they do so. Porter (1990) demonstrated for Germany, Japan, Switzerland
and the United States that the industries with the highest degree of international competitiveness are
regionally strongly clustered. Spatial nearness enables them to internalise externalities. This has to be
combined with product-cycle considerations: Up to the middle phase of the product-cycle these
externalities combine to fast growth, agglomeration and concentration on those very products,
benefiting most from externalities. Other products are driven out of the region, and the “shadow” of
the agglomeration (Arthur 1990, 247) prevents other clusters to form in the neighbourhood. In the late
phase of the product cycle, however, when the growth of the dominating product fades away, the
cluster and the region are likely to age and it is not easy to rejuvenate them (Tichy 1998a). A
combination of these elements of new theories can thus tell a story of the rise and fall of regions – if
probably not of nations – which neoclassical theory cannot tell.
Quah (1996b, 3f) pointed towards the importance of regional linkages: “By contrast, in the empirics
below, I show that a regions’ economic wellbeing can be predicted by that in both surrounding regions
and the host state. Both factors matter for regional distribution dynamics. Thus, by either
consideration, European regions are not isolated islands. More than does the host country’s economic
performance, that of surrounding regions helps us understand the inequalities across European regions.
Thus for explaining regional distribution dynamics, physical location and geographical spillovers
matter more than do national, macro factors.” Even if Quah’s analysis is not without contra-evidence –
he studied regional per-capita income while industry-studies find inter-country differences still larger
than inter-industry ones – it points clearly towards the increasing importance of geographical elements
even in standard economic analysis.
       #   (OHPHQWVRIDWKHRU\RIHQGRJHQRXVIDFWRU
PLJUDWLRQ
The neoclassical mainstream model rested on rather simple assumptions about possible and actual
mobility of factors of production: Labour was assumed completely mobile within a country, reacting
sensitively to wage differentials, but completely immobile among countries. Capital was assumed to
move freely within countries as well as in-between them, equalising interest rates. Brain capital, i.e.geography.doc   23.8.1998
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technological knowhow was not dealt with in the traditional model and assumed as a fully mobile
public good lately. All these assumption were considered as more and more unsatisfying by most
modern students, at odds with reality and barricading the way towards an explanation of the most
pressing problems.
Labour was at no times immobile in economic reality. International migration of labour is not only
a problem of our days, it has always been a problem, from the earliest days, when the Jews started to
find the Promised Land. In the 1980’s about 100 million people were living outside their countries of
birth or citizenship, 45 million in Europe and North America, approximately 2 percent and 7 percent of
the respective population (Pries 1997a, 15). In the second half of the 19
th century the absolute number
of migrants was off course much smaller, but probably not their share in population (Castles and Miller
1997). Labour, therefore, is not at all immobile between countries (and much less then fully mobile
among regions), and more than solitary exogenous factors are responsible for international migration.
Econometric estimates suggest income differences as only one of several determinants of today’s
migration. The probably most important causes are habit (significant lagged dependent variable and
country-specific coefficients in the equations), labour demand in the receiving country
26 and the level
of income in the sending country in an inverted U-pattern: If income rises from a very low basis,
emigration increases due to better information and less binding financial restraints, but falls back with
increasing wealth (Faini and Venturini 1993, 441).
As to the mobility of capital one has to distinguish financial capital from physical one: Financial
capital appears to be internationally highly mobile indeed and following interest-rate differentials,
even if even the most sophisticated empirical tests of interest arbitrage leave unexplained residuals,
indicating omitted explanatory variables. International mobility of physical capital on the other hand
cannot be easily explained by interest rate differentials, nor is it true that it moves from (capital-)rich
to poor countries: 76 percent of world foreign direct investment during 1988/93 flowed to developed
countries, of which 43 percent to EU-countries and 21 percent to the U.S.A; more than half (58
percent) of direct investment flowing to EU-countries had its origin in other EU-countries, with the
richer countries as the main recipients. A rather similar pattern can be found for mergers. These facts
suggest that the movements of physical capital follow a much more complicated pattern, similar to the
one suggested by modern trade theory and the theory of the international firm with specialisation, scale
economies, utilisation of local skills, etc. as the dominant explanations. In general, however, one
should not overemphasise the mobility of capital, so much publicised by the financial press: Feldstein
and Horioka (1980) found that national saving is the most important determinant of national
investment, and this has not changed in the meantime, notwithstanding the booming literature on
efficient capital markets (Gordon and Bovenberg 1996).
Technical knowledge, finally, is a complicated factor of production, as has been demonstrated in the
section on innovation theory. Far from being a public good at free disposal to anybody in need of it, it
evidently has national characteristics and implies externalities. Total factor productivity depends not
only on domestic R&D but also on foreign one (Coe and Helpman 1995), especially in small countries.
Technology is transmitted by international trade in intermediate and investment goods, but definitely
needs receptivity on the side of the receiving country, that is an adequate level of education, technical
knowledge and at least some own R&D. The theoretical concept of pure imitation has no counterpart in
the real world: Any imitation implies at least some minor innovation (Tichy 1991).
As to the (re-)integration of geographical elements into mainstream economic theory, the elements
of an endogenous theory of factor mobility and migration appear to be of utmost importance. They
demonstrate that national borders are not negligible but of varying importance, depending on the
subject under investigation. In some examples a regions’ economic wellbeing can be better predicted
by that in her surrounding regions than by that the host state (Quah 1996b, 3f), in other ones the
                                                          
26  Freeman (1993, 448) emphasises “receptivity to immigration” in general as the missing element in migration
analysis.geography.doc   23.8.1998
15
National Innovation System turns out to be of utmost importance. Political-administrative space,
economic space, social space (Pries 1997a, 16ff) and geographic space appear to interact in a
kaleidoscopic fashion, as European integration and the (overemphasised
27) globalisation strongly bring
to our minds. A broad field of problems of apparently geographical character arises in economics.
The problem of the political-administrative, economic and social space falling apart extends far
beyond geography and economic to geography and political science: The transfer of sovereignty to the
EU, implying concentration of power, and the secession of states earlier belonging to the Soviet
Empire, Yugoslavia or African states formed by the colonial powers, brought about research
investigating into the causes of size and number of nations. A trade-off was found between the
economies of scale of large jurisdictions and the costs of heterogeneity of large and diverse
populations. Democratisation and economic integration allow secession at lower political and
economic costs
28 and increase the number of independent countries, if no appropriate redistribution
systems are provided (Alesina and Spolaore 1995). EU’s member countries do not show much
awareness of this important result.
  6XPPDU\
This paper tried to demonstrate that geographic factors in general are very important for economic
development; by chance – or bad luck – this was not the case in the late 18
th century when economics
formed as a science. This congenital defect characterised mainstream economic theory for about 200
years. Sidelines only – German economics in the second half of the 19
th century, or unavoidably
location theory and regional economics – considered geographic factors, but never found their way into
the top-journals or best-selling text books. The concentration of mainstream economics on an abstract,
a-structural and a-geographical model contributed towards the uprise of economics as the most exact
and most “scientific” among the social sciences, but left many problems and developments of the
modern world unexplained.
In the late seventies the mathematical tools were available to deal with models, better suited to
explain the economic problems of our days: Models based on increasing economies to scale, imperfect
competition or externalities, partly internal, partly external to the firm. Contrary to the unequivocal
convergence path of the a-structural neoclassical model, the new class produced a rich diversity of
results, depending on a host of factors – initial conditions, structure, size of scale economies and
transport costs, size of coefficients, but to some extent stochastic elements – chance – as well. The
national and regional diversity gives room for geographic considerations, determining the specific
outcome within the general economic framework. In addition geographical aspects gain importance as
to increasing number of states – due to secessions –, and the growing importance of regions – caused
by dwindling importance of national economic policy as a consequence of institutional and factual
integration.





American Economic Review 19 674 2,8
                                                          
27 See  Tichy  1998b.
28  More interactions with surrounding foreign regions, less dependency on the host country.geography.doc   23.8.1998
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Economic Journal 6 310 1,9
European Economic Review 20 521 3,8
Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaft 4 86 4,7
Insgesamt 49 1591 3,1
All this should imply a growing number of articles dealing with geographic aspects. This however
is not the case. Krugman (1998, 172) deplores that the seminal theoretical articles have led to little
validating empirical work,
29 and in the top-economic journals not much work on geographical aspects
can be detected anyhow, as the table clearly demonstrates. As before articles dealing with spatial
aspects appear in the specialised journals on regional economics or urban planning. Only 3 percent of
the articles in four leading journals dealt with geographic themes. This is not very much, even
conceding that the field still is in its early teens. So one has to conclude: Economics has found a
methodology apt to find geography and it has produced a considerable number of seminal articles; but
it has not yet found geography in actual work.
                                                          
29  One must not forget, however, that reality changed considerably: Anecdotal evidence suggests, that firms still
cannot evaluate the costs of producing in peripheral countries, locating and relocating factories as they adjust
and re-adjust their estimates of relative cost-advantages. This makes it fairly impossible to collect data as an
input for empirical models.geography.doc   23.8.1998
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